Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers

9-14-2006

Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies:
Theory and Evidence
Carmine Guerriero
University of Cambridge, cg372@econ.cam.ac.uk

Follow this and additional works at: http://services.bepress.com/feem
Recommended Citation
Guerriero, Carmine , "Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and Evidence" (September 14, 2006). Fondazione Eni
Enrico Mattei Working Papers. Paper 10.
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper10

This working paper site is hosted by bepress. Copyright © 2006 by the author(s).

Guerriero: Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and Ev

Dependent Controllers
and Regulation Policies:
Theory and Evidence
Carmine Guerriero

NOTA DI LAVORO 109.2006

AUGUST 2006
PRCG – Privatisation, Regulation, Corporate Governance
Carmine Guerriero, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

This paper can be downloaded without charge at:
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index:
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927744

The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano (I), web site: www.feem.it, e-mail: working.papers@feem.it
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2006

1

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 10 [2006]

Dependent Controllers and Regulation Policies: Theory and
Evidence
Summary
This paper analyzes the political and efficiency-driven determinants of supervisors’
(i.e., regulators and judges) appointment rules and assesses the effect of such
institutions, considered as endogenous, on regulatory performances (i.e., prices).
Election lowers ex ante regulated rates and it is selected by partisan planners when the
risk related to expropriation of sunk investments and party policy differences are
smaller. Besides, when regulators are not eager to exert costly effort in supervision tasks
because interested in job offers from the industry (“revolving door” effect), only the
judicial selection rule significantly affects prices. U.S. electricity market’s data confirms
these predictions.
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Ad Antonio e Filomena: i miei genitori.

1. Introduction
Social “planners” must delegate actual policy choices to broadly defined “public
decision makers” and, in doing that, they design a set of institutions able to assure
that these agents behave coherently to their desiderata. Among such constitutional
rules selection mechanisms cover a crucial role. Appointment and election induce
different incentives. While politicians want to please the voters in order to win the
elections, career concerned bureaucrats want to appear competent to politicians or
to their appointing professional peers. However, the widely-accepted idea that
elected officials choose policies and appointed ones implement them finds a
remarkable exception in the U.S. regulatory system where regulators and High
Court judges can be either elected or appointed. Such an environment constitutes
a natural field where the relation between judicial, bureaucratic and political
powers can be analysed along with the relative merits of different accountability
designs. However, the existing literature has only taken into consideration the
regulatory institutions and, Besley and Coate [2003], in the first rigorous study of
the issue, claim that, in a perfect information world, election allows voters to
unbundle policy issues assuring lower regulated prices. The idea is appreciable in
its simplicity but far from reality. Indeed, when the rough symmetric information
hypothesis is relaxed, the consideration of the hierarchical structure (plannerregulator-judge-firm) through which the informational gap between planners and
regulated firms is bridged becomes crucial in understanding the functioning of the
agency architecture. As a careful institutional analysis reveals, a hierarchical rate
review process emphasizes the judges’ generosity of settlement; moreover, in my
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theory, the judicial role becomes pivotal when judges want to leave a legacy of
correctness (“legacy” effect) and regulators are not willing to exert costly effort
because interested in obtaining job offers from the industry (“revolving door”
effect). Election strengthens the first effect and damps the second one, moving
policies in a more populist direction. Clearly pro-industry planners will prefer
appointment when the risk related to expropriation of sunk investments is
considerable (i.e., high cost industry and efficient signal extraction technology).
Three are the main contributions of the paper: 1. the model finally clarifies the
relation between regulatory outcomes and judicial appointment, which is shown
to be the only relevant selection rule when the “revolving door” effect is strong; 2.
from a positive perspective,1 the paper identifies the political and efficiencydriven criteria that have guided partisan planners in allocating policy tasks to
elected or appointed policymakers. 3. U.S. electricity data confirm the model’s
predictions. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 clarifies the judges’ and
regulators’ activities within the U.S. electric power market. Section 3 illustrates
the model; while section 4 comments on the econometric results. Section 5
concludes delivering several remarks for constitutional designers. The appendix
contains tables, proofs and a detailed description of the data.

2. Institutions
Investor-owned electric utilities (IOUs) account for over three-fourths of the
electricity sales and revenues of the U. S. electricity market. While jurisdiction

1

Alesina and Tabellini [2005] embrace a normative perspective. Bureaucrats perform better than

politicians when vested interests have large stakes and ex-post voters’ preferences are predictable.

3
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over both interstate transmission and wholesale transactions lies inside a federal
body (FERC), retail services are regulated by state public utility commissions
(PUCs), which deal with several utilities (natural gas, telecommunications, water
and wastewater, trucking and railroad, insurance) and perform a broad range of
tasks (e.g. they suggest lines of conduct on services provision, they avoid bypassing by non regulated utilities, they rule on environmental issues and so forth)
among which the most important is the regulation of prices.2 IOUs are not
allowed to receive governmental subsides and their revenue must cover their costs
(including managerial rewards). IOUs charge two-part tariffs, triggering rate
reviews in response to rising costs (Joskow [1974]). Even if dockets can be
directly entrusted to a commissioner or to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),
almost all the files follow a precise hierarchical trial routine composed of two
levels of formal hearings open to all the interested parties (firms, ratepayers,
lawyers of the Attorney General’s Office). In the first instance, commissioners sit
on the bench. If the proposed filing is not approved, a formal quasi-judicial
hearing, presided by one or more ALJs, is opened and the quasi-judicial tribunal
takes a qualified majority enforceable judgment.3 During the hearings ALJs and
commissioners examine witnesses and experts, receive the evidence and interpret
precedents and regulations. The final motion to be approved is proposed by the
PUC’s staff. Ratepayers are represented by consumer advocates, who assure that

2

Here I follow the descriptions contained in the 1992 and 1997 Sunset Review of the Colorado

PUC and in the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC) official website.
3

At this point, PUCs may review the case, provided that the onus of injustice and illegality of the

decision lies on the firm. Moreover, the former can appeal to High Courts on formal issues.
However, these two last appeal levels are rarely granted.

4
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media carefully track the evolution of files.4 The resulting enormous body of
press testimonies reveals the critical and often underestimated relevance of ALJs’
activity. For instance, in 2004 an ALJ forced the Minnesota PUC to revise Qwest
rates on the bases of anticompetitive deals; while in 2005 the Texas PUC allowed
Cap Rock to recover most costs nixed by three ALJs. The above description
suggests two key peculiarities of this complex agency architecture:
1. The commissioners’ and ALJs’ role is one of supervision, i.e. they organize the
information disclosure process but do not formulate de facto the final motion. The
latter is put forward by the PUC’s staff that, given the complete record of the
hearings and the participation of all the parties, is forced to consider only the
available “hard” evidence. This is the main consequence of the adversarial nature
of the hearings: no evidence can be denied once the precedent is individuated.
2. The ALJs’ supervision activity evidently allows them to control regulatory
policies (see also Tiller [1998]). As a measure of such incidence, Table 2 reports
the average number (Dockets) and duration (Doc_Dur) of electricity dockets
opened in the market over the 1974-1990 period (see Table 1 for a complete
description of variables names and construction). A docket typically endures nine
months (with no significant pattern across selection regimes) and an impressing
85.7% of these files lasted more than 5 months (i.e., the maximum length of time
needed to set up quasi-judicial hearings): 5 ALJs rule almost all the US electricity

4

Consumer advocates are state-funded bodies established in the 70s and 80s in order to allow even

residential users to proceed before PUCs. The relative dummy is equal to 1 in the states listed in
Holburn and Van den Bergh [2003] plus California and Michigan. This choice is not relevant.
5

The cumulated number of days between the application reception and the quasi-judicial hearing

date do not usually exceed 154 days (see the 1997 Sunset Review of the Colorado PUC).
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dockets. Besides, the deep attention paid by ALJs to regulation cases would not
strike as strange given that electricity files, with their broad echo, represent the
most advertised among the policy positions (employment discrimination charges,
other regulation dockets, etc.) on which judges are selected.6
As follows I will first formalize the above agency relations, employing as basic
framework the Laffont and Tirole [1993]’s model, and then I will identify the
incentives shaping the supervisors’ activities.

3. Theory
The regulated firm produces a variable scale product q and it charges a two part
tariff A + pq for q > 0, where A and p are positive.7 Total cost is C = θ q and
marginal cost can take one of two values θ ∈ {θ ,θ } with probabilities v and 1 – v
respectively. Let be ∆θ = (θ − θ ) > 0 . Probabilities are common knowledge, but
only the firm’s manager knows the true value of θ .8 Consumers have the same

6

To this extent, do not surprise that courts have referred to industry’s influence to vindicate

judicial review of PUC’s decisions (State Farm 463US29, [1983]) and that five of the eleven
Texas politicians, who got some of Enron’s PAC last money, were ALJs (see the FTCR website).
Finally, judges not only take authoritarian part into the pricing process, but they also overrule
other PUCs’ policy orientations. A few years ago, the Pennsylvania PUC has rejected the decision
of an ALJ to block the Southwestern Bell caller rates because not considered in the public interest.
7

As Joskow and Schmalensee [1986] suggest the fixed premium paid by consumers turns out to

assume the some role of the governmental transfer typical of the regulation-procurement literature.
As a consequence, I replace the economic shadow cost of public funds with the marginal
deadweight loss associated with an increase in the fixed premium.
8

Guerriero [2006, b] extends this model to the analysis of cost-reimbursement’s rules reforms.

6
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preferences; thus the demand is the one of a representative consumer with gross
consumer surplus given by S(q). The inverse and regular demand functions and
the firm’s revenue are given by p = P(q) = S′(q), q = D(p), R(q) = P(q)q + A
respectively. Consumers choose q as to maximize net surplus S(⋅) – A – pq and A
is optimally fixed so as to make them indifferent between buying or not the good
i.e., A ≡ S(q) – P(q)q. As underlined in section 2, firm’s revenues must cover
managerial reward t; this implies that: A + pq(p) ≥ t. Both the firm and the
supervisors are risk neutral with respect to income. The firm’s utility is given by
U = t – θ q ≥ 0 and a reservation level of 0 is required. Let me denote the social
surplus obtained producing q as V(q) with V(0) = 0, V′ > 0 and V′′< 0. V(q) is the
sum of consumers’ net surplus plus the firm’s revenue evaluated at the shadow
price of managerial reward λ and it rewrites as:
V(q) = (S(q) – R(q)) + (1+λ)R(q) = S(q) +λR(q) = (1+λ)S(q).
The planner’s objective function, labelled with subscript P, is:
WP = S(q(p)) – A – pq(p) + (1+λ) (A + pq(p) – t) + U =
= V(q) – (1+λ)C – λU = V(q) – (1+λ) θ q – λU.

(1)

Here, 1 + λ can be interpreted as the shadow price of the firm’s budget constraint;
note that, in contrast with the program where governmental transfers are allowed,

λ depends on both c and t. Under complete information, the planner implements
the first best allocation through a simple cost target contract leaving no rent to the
firm. Instead, under asymmetric information, she does not observe the realization
of θ and maximizes expected social welfare offering a pair of incentive
compatible schemes ( q , t ), ( q , t ). The low cost firm enjoys an informational rent
while the high cost one receives a distorted allocation (see Laffont and Tirole
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[1993] for details). Now suppose that the planner can relax the informational
asymmetry by employing a hierarchy of two supervisors (i.e. a regulator and a
judge) designed to match the institutions described in section 2. These supervisors
can, exerting costly effort, tailor the supervision activity to the specific docket
(i.e., they choose the number and quality of the experts, the firms’ official papers
to be examined and so forth). The equilibrium level of effort and the supervisors’
random ability (e.g., ability to examine witnesses and to understand precedents
and prevailing regulations) determine the precision of the planner’s signal. As
emphasized in section 2, the report is effectively delivered by the PUC’s staff, so
I simply assume that the planner has directly at her disposal this benevolent
information tool.9 Moreover, given that in the U.S. electricity market PUCs’ rules
and conducts prohibit communication between supervisors, no side contract is
allowed between these players. Once one of the two docket’s filing steps is set up,
the planner receives a signal σ = { θ ; φ } about the cost structure with precision ξ
determined by the supervisors’ activity. The information is hard in the sense that
it is verifiable and every interested party can convince himself that the signal
corresponds to the true state of the world. The signal can only inform about θ . If
θ = θ with probability ξ the planner sees σ = θ and implements the complete
information contract and with probability 1 – ξ she observes σ = φ . If θ = θ , then
σ = φ always.10 When σ = φ , the planner is uninformed, and she updates her
beliefs applying Bayes rule. Supervisors are evaluated according to the
9

Besides the constraints imposed by the adversarial trial structure, explicit incentives can be

designed for staff’s members, who are not implicitly motivated by any appointment rule.
10

This technology simplifies the notation and has the appealing feature that the agent can provide

verifiable information only when the proof is possible: low cost case (see also Laffont [2000]).

8
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performance ξ ∈ [0, 1], which is described by the docket’s records and has a
technology given by ξ = αe + e. Each supervisor first exerts effort and then she
learns her ability. Effort e takes value on (0, ξ u /2] with ξ u ∈ ( 0,1 ) . The effort’s
cost function writes as C (i) = C (i)(1 − K ) where K ∈ 0, K ) measures the efficiency

of the signal extraction technology; K is increasing in the amount of PUC’s
resources and in the watchdog groups’ ability to provide hard information.
Suppose that: C e > 0 , C ee > 0 , C (0) = 0 and limU C = ∞ . Thus, the full precision
e →ξ

case is ruled out and it is not possible to obtain a precision of ξ u through effort
only. The random ability α has support (0, 1). Without no loss of generality,11
suppose that α ~ Beta (g, b) with density fy(y; g, b) = [yg–1(1 – y)b–1]/B(g, b) and
1

B(g, b) = ∫ y g −1 (1 − y )b −1 dy (the Beta function). The mean is α = g/(g + b). If g = b
0

= 1, I obtain a uniform distribution on (0, 1): from a Bayesian point of view, this
is the case of uninformative prior on the supervisors’ ability. The mild restrictions
I impose on g and b are such that the distribution of α is symmetric (g = b), which
can be relaxed and hump-shaped (informative), i.e. g > 1 and b > 1. Here α and e
assume the meaning of overall measures: they take into account the different
judges’ and regulators’ abilities. For sake of comparison I will exhibit the case of
equal draw of α. If either e or ξ are verifiable or contractible, a simple “selling the
store” contract reaches efficiency. However, the assumption that the planner can
write unrestricted contingent contracts with the supervisors does not fit in any
way reality and so I assume that ξ is always observable but not contractible.
11

Indeed, all the theoretical results continue to hold if one of the other continuous non degenerate

distributions supported on a bounded interval (i.e.: Triangular, Kumaraswamy, Logarithmic,

9
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The timing of the game is given as follows:

1. Society (planner, firm, regulator and judge if addressed; see stage 3. and 4.
below) learns the nature of the regulatory environment: P(q) and that θ ∈ {θ , θ } .

Next the firm discovers the only piece of private information: θ.

2. The planner offers a menu of managerial reward-quantity pairs to the firm
contingent to the realization of the eventual signals obtained through the hearing
process. Moreover, an exogenously given wage s, set at the reservation level ŝ
(for sake of simplicity assumed equal for both), is given to the two supervisors.12

3. The regulator chooses her level of effort; next she discovers her random ability
and, at last, the planner receives the first signal. If this is informative the first best
is implemented; otherwise a hearing is open and the judge is asked to rule it.

4. Step 3. is repeated for the judge. If the signal is uninformative, the planner asks
to the firm to report its marginal cost (asymmetric information regime).

5. Last a reward-quantity pair is implemented and evaluators make their move.13
Supervisors face different incentives as a function of the nature of the task and of
the selection rule. The two dimensions of heterogeneity (regulators vs. judges and
appointed vs. elected) are captured by the indexes i = {Appointed, Elected} and l

Uniform) is employed (see also footnote 13). Among these, the Beta function is the most versatile.
12

Laffont and Martimort [1999] suppose full contracting on the supervisors’ performance. The

resulting equilibria are collusion-proof, i.e. costly rewards are paid to non-benevolent supervisors
and the high cost type allocation is distorted even more in order to lower the firm stake. This set
up is neither realistic nor able to capture the supervisors’ implicit incentives.
13

Elected supervisors are evaluated by a rational electorate (this is true for judges as well and,

indeed, “the curse of the elective system is that it turns every elective judge into a politician,”
ABA, 1981). Appointed supervisors are evaluated by politicians or by a selection committee.

10
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= {Regulator, Judge}. The supervisors’ utility function is given by:

{

}

Ri ,l (ei ,l , S ) = 1 + τ (1 − SR )G i (ei ,l ) − (1 − (1 − S ) J )C (ei ,l )  sˆ .

(2)

In (2), S is equal to 1 for a regulator and to 0 for a judge and the parameter τ
measures the strength of the career concerns. G i ( ei ,l ) differentiates bureaucrats
and politicians (here my reference is the Alesina and Tabellini [2005, a]’s model).
Politicians want to be re-elected and this happens if ξ E ,l exceeds a threshold ξ E ,l .
This amounts to say that G E ( eE ,l ) = Pr {ξ E ,l ≥ ξ E ,l } . Voters are rational in the sense
that they understand that the alternative to the incumbent is another politician with
average talent who will achieve a precision ξ E ,l = (3 / 2)eEexp,l (where the apex exp
refers to the voters’ expectation). Therefore, it follows that: G E ( eE ,l ) = Pr {α ≥

}

≥ ( 3eEexp,l / 2eE ,l ) −1 . Instead, bureaucrats are career concerned and they want to

maximize the conditional perception of their ability. Employing E(·) (or, with a
slight abuse of notation, the apex exp) to indicate the evaluator’s expectation over
α given the performance realization and E to label the unconditional expectation

{

}

over ξ A,l , it follows that: G A ( eA,l ) = E ( E (α ξ A,l ) ) = E (1 + α ) eA,l − eAexp,l  / eAexp,l . Now,
a glance at G E ( i ) and G A ( i ) reveals how elected supervisors will exert more
effort than appointed ones.14 Finally in (2) R and J represent regulators and judges
14

In fact, the density of the Beta evaluated at the mean is always greater than 1 for all g and b

greater than 1. The relevant inequality (i.e., fα( α ) > 1) remains true for g ≠ b (asymmetric Beta)
and for all the other continuous distributions supported on a bounded interval (except for the
uninformative prior/uniform case when it holds as equality) when the hump-shape property is
imposed. Proofs are available upon request. The result becomes local for imperfect substitutability
between e and α (ξ = (α + Z)e). Here, I need: [Z + g/(g+b)] fα( α ) > [1 + Zg/(g+b)].

11
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specific parameters. They are defined on (0, 1). R captures the “revolving-door”
effect: regulators are attracted by future job opportunities in the regulated
industry. The higher is R the less willing will be a regulator to exert effort in order
to favour her future principals. J formalizes the judges’ desire to leave a legacy of
correctness and fairness (“legacy effect”). The higher is J the lower will be the
cost for a judge to put effort into a proceeding in order to uncover the true (see
also Levy [2005]).15 The solution to the supervisors’ optimum problems (see
Appendix 6.1) implies the following equilibrium efforts’ rankings: eˆE , J > eˆA, J and
eˆE , R > eˆA, R . Judges and politicians exert more effort than regulators and bureaucrats

respectively. Besides, note that: 1. eˆA, J is greater than eˆE , R if (1 – R)(1 – J) fα( α )
< 1; 2. a more efficient supervision technology (higher K) increases all the
equilibrium levels of effort; 3. other accountability institutions affect the implicit
incentives’ power and, in particular, a longer length term would relax the
“revolving door” effect creating focus on the signal extraction task. At stage 2. the
planner foresees the supervisors’ moves and offers to the firm a menu of contracts
contingent on the eventual signals {σR, σJ} and characterized by the above levels
of effort. Here, there is no strategic interaction between the supervisors’ effort
choice and the planner’s mechanism design program: this nicely reveals division
of powers’ properties of the model. The planner’s posterior belief on θ = θ is:
Pr(θ = θ / σ R = φ , σ J = φ ) =

v (1 − {E[ξi , R (eˆi , R )] + (1 − E[ξi , R (eˆi , R )]) E[ξi , J (eˆi , J )]}) v(1 − γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )) .
=
1 − v{E[ξi , R (eˆi , R )] + (1 − E[ξi , R (eˆi , R )]) E[ξi , J (eˆi , J )]}
1 − vγ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )

Define µ as the shadow cost of public funds. In the supervision regime (apex S)
the planner’s ex-post expected welfare function writes as:

15

The revolving door effect does not seem to exist for ALJs.

12
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 v (1 − γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )) 
*
S
S
ˆS
WPAI , S = vγ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )W + [1 − vγ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )] 
V ( qˆ ) − (1 + λ )θ qˆ − λ∆θ q  +
 1 − vγ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )
+


1− v
V ( qˆ S ) − (1 + λ )θ qˆ S   − 2(1 + µ ) sˆ .


1 − vγ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )


(3)

As usual, the inefficiency introduced by the asymmetry in information is entirely
absorbed by the distortion in the low (high cost) type’s quantity. Thus, differences
in the ex ante regulated prices are entirely determined by the low type equilibrium
allocation qˆ S , which is pinned down by the following condition:
λ v (1 − γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J ))
∆θ .
V ′( qˆ S ) = (1 + λ ) S ′( qˆ S ) = (1 + λ )θ +
1− v

(4)

In order to lower the high type rent, the planner is forced to distort the low type’s
allocation away from the first best; however, in (4) higher values of K and
supervisors’ election increase γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J ) . Thus, more efficient signal extraction
technologies and the election rule curb such a distortion and a nice substitutability
between explicit market incentives to the regulated firm and the design of the
hierarchical institutions arises. Proposition 1 summarizes:

Proposition 1: Elected supervisors and a more efficient supervision technology
lower ex-ante equilibrium prices.

Similarly, the desire to leave a legacy of fairness (high J) and a mild exposure to
“revolving door” promises (small R) increase the precision of the planner’s signal
(i.e., the value of γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J ) ). Such a remark suggests that there is an high enough
value of R (say R ) such that almost all the dockets approach the quasi-judicial
hearing stage because regulators select a very small level of effort; symmetrically
does exist an high enough value of J (say J ) such that the eventual second signal
received by the planner (σJ) has a very high precision. Thus for values of R and J

13
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higher than R and J respectively, the marginal effect of the regulators’ selection
rule becomes almost insignificant in explaining prices: this is confirmed by the
model’s calibration (tables available upon request). When I impose a quadratic
cost function the order eˆE , J > eˆA, J > eˆE , R > eˆA, R is upset only for very low values of R
and J, generally (it depends on the values of g and h) smaller than 0.25, and the
judge’s marginal effect is significantly bigger than the regulator’s one for high
enough values of R and J.16 Clearly enough, these features remain true when I
endow appointed regulators with bigger R. This variation captures the Besley and
Coate [2003]’s bundling effect: governor interested in the industry support select
pro-shareholders regulators. The following proposition summarizes:

Proposition 2: For high enough values of R or J, only the judges’ selection rule
significantly affect ex ante regulated prices.

At this point, it is instructive to stress that the picture drawn until now is partially
shaded. I assumed a myopic and public interested planner, but what happens
when partisan interests and concern for firm’s investments appear on the scene?

3.1 Endogenous Appointment Rules
Following Laffont and Tirole [1993], a sharp tension between rent extraction and
investments arises in industrial policies: whether or not the planner can commit to
a contract contingent on the level of investments, equilibrium allocations can

16

The pure elective supervisors’ marginal effects ratio 1 − E [ξ E , R (eˆE , R )] E ξ E , J ( eˆE , J )  E [ξ E , R (eˆE , R )] =

 


is generally about 4 for low values (i.e.: 0.2) of both R and J and quickly rises to 7-10 for enough
strong implicit incentives (R or J over 0.5, or both over 0.4). R is the more effective among the
two parameters in pushing π up, i.e. there is a first mover prevalence of the regulator’s activity.

14
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envision ex post expropriation of sunk investments. In this sense, non-benevolent
supervisors may relax such a time inconsistency. The intuition proposes several
crucial questions: is it possible to think of the supervisors’ effort exertion as a
pandering activity when investments decisions are taken into consideration? How
much partisan planners care about such decisions when they select appointment
rules? How much is this choice driven by efficiency evaluations and how strong
are the rent seeking forces? A first set of answers arise naturally when the above
model is bridged to the parallel analysis in Laffont and Tirole [1993]. Let me
assume that, before stage 1., the regulated firm fixes the level of a non
contractible investment of cost I that increases of ζ(I) the probability that a high
type is drawn. Let me assume that ζ ′(i) > 0, ζ ′′(i) < 0, lim I = ∞, v = (1 − v) / v and
I →ζ −1 ( v )

that investments are sufficiently effective, i.e. ζ ′(i) > 1 (v∆θ ) . The planner lacks
commitment but anticipates the optimal I (i.e., I*). Ex ante the firm maximizes its
expected ex post rent minus investment costs:

{

}

I * ∈ arg max I ≥0 v(1 + ζ ( I ))[1 − γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )]∆θ qˆ S , I ( I * ) − I .

(5)

The firm underinvests with respect to the social optimum (see Appendix 6.2 for a
revealed preference argument) and a glance to (5) suggests that the extent of
inefficiency is higher the more precise the planner’s signal is. So the supervisors’
information extraction activity can assume a pandering feature when effort is
driven more by career concerns than by a farsighted interest in the market’s
efficiency and a planner caring about cost-reducing investments, because faced
with a high cost market, will prefer appointment. Proposition 3 summarizes:

Proposition 3: An investment-concerned planner prefers supervisors’ election if
faced with a low cost industry or a less efficient supervision technology.

15
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This inefficiency is even stronger when investments are directed towards
reliability and quality services. In fact, these activities do not lower the firm’s cost
but increase its long run profits: evidently also a conflict between consumers’
groups arises here. To capture this, I assume that the constitutional reform is
decided by the incumbent among two parties: one more pro-shareholders R
(Republican) and one more pro-consumers D (Democratic). Between stages 1.
and 2., each party faces an election with winning probability xj (j = [D, R]). The
winner decides the size of an instrument (ρj) increasing the investment’s utility for
the firm ( G ( I , ρˆ j ) ). A type j planner attaches weights χ J and χj to G (i) and I
respectively. The weights are such that: χ R = 1 + 2 d , χ D = 1 + d , χ R = 2 d − 1, χ D = d − 1
and d > λ represents the extent of party policy differences. Thus, a Republican
planner values more I and dislikes less an increase in the firm’s rent. The firm is
risk averse towards non cost-reducing investments and the following regularities
hold: G1 > 0, G11 < 0, G 2 > 0, G 22 < 0, G12 > 0, G 21 > 0 .
Before stage 3., the firm chooses the non-observable and non-contractible I as to
maximize its expected ex post utility subject to the budget constraint:

{

}

I * arg max I ≥0 G( I , ρˆ j ) + tˆ − θ qˆ S , I s.t.: A + pq ≥ t + I .

(6)

I* is a function of the selection rules and of both d and of the optimal ρj, which is

such that: ρˆ R > ρˆ D . Let me define I * (qˆ S , I (i), ρˆ j ) ≡ I (i, j ) . It follows that I ( A, R) ≥
≥ I ( E, R) ≥ I ( A, D) ≥ I ( E, D) . Let me focus on regimes in which supervisors share

the same selection rule and define:
γ (i) ≡ 1 − γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J ) ;
G ( I (i, j ), ρˆ j ) ≡ G (i, j )

I (i, j ) ≡ I (i, − j ) + x j ( I (i, j ) − I (i, − j )) ;
G (i, j ) ≡ G (i, − j ) + x j (G (i, j ) − G (i, − j )) .

;

On top of it, a type j planner’s ex post expected welfare function writes as:

16
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(

W jAI ,S , I (i, j ) = WPAI , S (i ) + vγ (i ) (1 + λ + χ j )G (i, j ) + ( χ j − 1 − λ ) I (i, j )  − ο 1 − ∂G (i, j ) ∂I

)

where ο is the shadow price of the moral hazard in investment constraint (first
order condition of (6)). The planner considers the political uncertainty and selects
appointment the greater is the likelihood of expropriation. Such a strategic
institutional design explanation extends to the regulators’ appointment rules’
reform the intuition suggested by Hanssen [2004 b] for the ALJs’ selection rule
(i.e., the election of ALJs is linked to a stronger incumbent grip on power and to a
smaller party policy distance).17 The constitutional design is affected by xj and d
and partisan planners design regulatory institutions in a dynamically inefficient
manner if enough interested in assuring high rents to the regulated firm.
Proposition 4 reports the precise patterns (see Appendix 6.3 for proofs):

Proposition 4: A. Republican incumbent reformers prefer elected regulators to
appointed ones. B. The likelihood of a reform towards regulators’ election is
higher the smaller the party policy differences are and the weaker (stronger) the
incumbent party’s grip on power is if she is Republican (Democratic).

As main result the above section has identified the political and efficiency-driven
forces that have guided partisan planners in allocating policy tasks to elected and
appointed supervisors. However, when positive rents remain in equilibrium and
new resources are in the hands of the regulated firm, the fear of supervisors’
capture constitutes a last crucial issue to be discussed: section 3.2 closes the
theory proposing a few remarks about the impact on the model of the action of an
organized group interested in maximizing the regulated firm’s rent.
17

Several studies demonstrate that a lack of permanence in office can inspire policymakers to

implement institutional reforms either to influence political outcomes or to impose constraints on
future incumbents (see Persson and Svensson [1988] and Tabellini and Alesina [1990]).
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3.2 Robustness: Lobbying and Bribing
Both ALJs and PUCs’ commissioners exert effort in other tasks. As seen above,
examples are the control of bypassing by non-regulated utilities and the analysis
of environmental regulation. The organized group want to relax the supervision
constraint offering side-contracts conditional on this second effort level supposed
(as in Alesina and Tabellini [2005 a]) observable and contractible.18 The interest
group has all the bargaining power and influences supervisors, one at the time,
either directly (bribes) or indirectly (campaign contributions) just before the
supervision effort is decided in stages 3. or in 4.. Let me assume that the level of
performance from the extra task h brings a small positive extra-utility to the firm
but implies a relevant cost (in terms of effort) to the supervisor (i.e., the effort
cost function C ( ei ,l + eih,l ) is non-divisible). It turns out that in a jointly optimal
equilibrium eˆi ,l = 0 so that the high type’s firm enjoys a higher informational rent
(proofs are available upon request). Even if discouraging, these equilibria are
fragile and the following remarks apply: 1. Judges are less corruptible even if the
return to bribe them is higher (they exert a higher level of effort); 2. Bribes do not
arise if the punishment that a supervisor receives if caught is high enough; 3.
Campaign contributions, although legal, would be not even affordable for the
interest group, which has to reimburse supervisors for the entire amount of
implicit incentives (this is due to the multiplicative technology for the precision).
Thus, provided that implicit incentives are strong enough (i.e., high enough τ, R
and J in (2)) the model remains robust to the introduction of lobbying and bribing.
18

Here I take aside the eventual multiple principals-multiple agents’ strategic interaction, i.e. cost

minimization across supervisors’ side payments. This remains as open agenda for future research.
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It is clear how, at this point, the other main contribution of the paper is to face the
above model with the U.S. electric power market’s data.

4. Evidence: Elected vs. Appointed Supervisors
The empirical analysis of the paper refers to two main bodies of literature: elected
vs. appointed regulators and elected vs. appointed judges. While a first colourful

block19 of empirical analysis reported mixed and not conclusive evidence, recent
literature has claimed that elected regulators tend to be more populist in their
policy making.20 Interesting is the cross firms approach chosen by Kwoka [2002]
who, employing data on IOUs and POUs (Public Owned Utilities) for the 1996,
shows that accountability-enhancing institutions (elected commissioners, PUCs
with fewer members and public ownership) are linked to lower electricity prices.
The main drawback of this cross states tradition is that time periods and controls
differ widely among studies and Besley and Coate [2003] have considered this
literature “worrisome for convincing empirical testing.” In order to solve the
issue, recent works have considered also the time dimension. Looking at the longrun mean electricity prices for residential, commercial and industrial users for a
panel of 44 states, Besley and Coate [2003] find that elected regulators set lower

19

Some of these contributions looked at rate setting while others have chosen, as regulatory

performances, broad measures of the regulatory climate. Examples are: Berry [1979], Harris and
Navarro [1983], Smiley and Green [1983], Costello [1984], Crain and McCormick [1984],
Primeaux and Mann [1986] and Atkinson and Nowell [1994].
20

Falaschetti [2005] reports results that suggest how providers of local exchange services maintain

significantly smaller capital stocks in electing states. Other interesting contributions are: Smart
[1994], Mishra and Thistle [1995] and Fields, Klein and Sfiridis [1997].
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residential rates and are less likely to pass through cost changes into prices.
Employing a panel of electric utilities’ rate reviews, Holburn and Spiller [2002]
show that elected PUCs are linked to lower residential-industrial rate ratios and
lower returns on equity. A smaller amount of empirical work has dealt with the
differences among appointed and elected judges.21 Helland and Tabarrok [1999,
2000] find evidence that partisan elected judges redistribute wealth from out-ofstate business to in-state plaintiffs, who are typically voters. Besley and Payne
[2003] study a panel of U.S. States and report results according to which
appointing states see fewer charges for race, age and gender discrimination being
brought. Two are the contributions of the empirical part of the paper: 1. evaluate
the relative explaining power of the political and efficiency-driven determinants
of appointment rules; 2. bridge the different empirical traditions paying, at last,
attention to the relation linking the judges’ appointment rule and regulatory
performances. As a consequence, two are also the sets of empirical predictions:

Empirical Predictions: 1. A. Supervisors’ election is linked to less effective
supervision technologies and to low cost industries; B. Regulators’ election is
more likely if the reformer is Democratic, the smaller party policy differences are
and the lower (higher) the incumbent grip on power is if she is Republican
(Democratic). Judges’ election is more likely the stronger the grip on power is
and the smaller party policy differences are. 2. A. Supervisors’ election and an
efficient supervision technology lower ex-ante equilibrium prices; B. Regulators’
election would likely be not (statistically) significant in explaining prices.
21

Lateral evidence (see Hanssen [1999, 2000]) highlights how appointed courts are associated

with a higher degree of decision uncertainty (i.e., higher number of PUCs’ disputes, of High Court
filings and higher number of employees in regulatory, insurance and education bureaucracies).
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I take advantage of my forerunners; so I first present cross firms results for the
1996 (as in Kwoka [2002] this would avoid the small sample pitfalls of a cross
states analysis), warning the reader that this strategy can lead to fragile inference
in presence of “non-random pattern of constitutional reforms and the extensive
differences among [individuals] belonging to different constitutional groups”
(Persson and Tabellini [2003]). Then, as final robustness checks, panel estimates
in all similar to the one reported in Besley and Coate [2003] are commented. First
of all, point 1. of the Empirical Predictions is evaluated.

4.1 Non Random Constitution Selection
Institutions are defined as follows. The elected judges’ dummy (Jud_Elec) takes
value 1 if ALJs are selected through both partisan or non-partisan election and 0
otherwise (e.g.: appointment by state legislature, gubernatorial and merit plan
appointment). As Table 3 shows, 13 states have changed their judges’ selection
rule during the sample 1970-1997; among these, eight switched from election to
appointment (or vice versa).22 The elected regulators’ dummy (Reg_Elec) takes
value 1 if PUCs’ commissioners are in whatever way elected, 0 otherwise;23 six

22

Non-partisan election forbids candidates to reveal party affiliation, but most researchers agree

that the two institutions are alike (see Atkins and Glick [1974]). Some state imposes retention
election to judges (merit plan). Besley and Payne [2003] claim that these states would constitute a
third group in which retention produces an extra accountability incentive; but Hall and Aspin
[1987] show how sitting judges almost never loose these elections. Besides it is widely accepted
that merit plan, that forbids campaign contributions by law, produces the most independent judges.
23

There are seven regulatory selection rules (see Besley and Coate [2003]). South Carolina and

Tennessee both switched in 1996. I considered both states as electing given that the previously
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are the switching states (see Table 3). These two dummies are lowly correlated (–
0.006); so I can control prices for both of them at the same time without fear for
multicollinearity. To capture the party policy differences and the efficiency of the
production and signal extraction technologies, I need reasonable proxies. Party
policy differences are measured by the absolute difference in the percentage of
seats held by Democrats and Republicans (Av_Dist); while the average percentage
of seats held by the majority party (Av_Maj) is the proxy capturing the incumbent
holding on power (see Hanssen [2004, b]). Two long run means (Av_Maj.1996
and Av_Dist.1996) are introduced as controls in the cross-sectional index models
where the incumbent holding on power’s hypothesis cannot be tested. Besides, in
the Reg_Elec index model the effect of a Republican incumbent party (Rep) is
introduced both directly and indirectly. Creating a proxy for the efficiency of the
supervision technology is a more complex task. My strategy is to use the two sets
of observables that more likely enhance the likelihood of information extraction:
proxies for the power of watchdog groups and measures of the amount of staff’s
resources. The first group includes: Ind (proportion of revenues form sales to
industrial users), Advocate (state consumer advocate office’s dummy), Over_65
(proportion of population aged over 65), Young (proportion aged 5-17). The
second set is composed by Budget (PUC’s staff budget) and Employ (the number
of permanent staff’s members). The latter, unfortunately, is a very crude measure
for efficiency. Varied and unobservable (in my data) skills are required to the
PUC’s members so it is not clear if higher values of Employ assure a more precise
signal or instead relax the staff’s benevolence. Investments’ concerns are likely

elected commissioners were confirmed. No one of the results is affected when I consider the two
states as appointing or I employ slightly different definitions for Reg_Elec and Jud_Elec.
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linked to costly generation (P_Fuel, cst and O&M) and to the imputed cost of net
electric utility plant (Plant). Because public officials’ accountability depends not
only on the selection rules but also on how often evaluators can fire them, I add as
covariate the length of the judicial term, Jud_Term (the regulators’ one is never
significant). Finally, other controls are: dockets’ duration Doc_Dur (a proxy for
state specific litigation features), generation by fossil fuels sources (Gen_Fuel),
state population (Pop), income (Income) and education (Edu) and year in which
the state has joined the union (Join). Table 4 reports the results of both a Logit
model run on a cross section of 144 firms for the 1996 and a random effect panel
Logit run on a panel of 49 states over the 1970-1997 sample. Controls excluded in
one specification and other covariates employed in the pricing equations were
highly not significant. The evidence strongly supports the model’s predictions.24
For what concern the holding on power proxies, the results clearly lean towards
the strategic use explanation: smaller party policy differences favour supervisors’
election and Republican incumbents tend to prefer appointed regulators. A bit
more mixed is the evidence on the efficiency of the signal extraction technology:
when significant, the coefficients attached to the proxies present the correct signs,
all except the one attached to Employ, Budget, Over_65 and Ind. While the first
sign comes at no surprise given the above remark, an appealing explanation for

24

Hanssen [2004 b] reports similar evidence on the strategic use effect for the judges’ selection

rule while Falaschetti [2005] and Holburn and Vanden Bergh [2003] show some similar results for
the regulators’ selection rule. In order to check part 1.B of the Empirical Predictions, remember
that the impact of an incumbent Republican reformer is simply given by the sum of the coefficient
on Rep plus the coefficient on Av_Maj*Rep multiplied for the mean of Av_Maj, i.e.: – 6.413 =
39.449 – 68.553*0.669. Similar calculations imply that the Democratic marginal effect is: – 0.731.
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the last three is that, in a dynamic set up, the friction between supervisors and
interested parties would become so sour to deteriorate the quality of the signal.
Finally, high marginal costs increase the attractiveness of appointed supervisors.
The main empirical patterns remain true when states’ level data are employed.
Next I will analyze the relation between selection rules and regulated prices.

4.2

Pricing Models

Table 2 reports the differences in non-controlled long run prices’ means between

states that elect and appoint their ALJs. The latter states enjoyed significantly (at
1%) lower rates for all customer classes (1970-97).25 This finding is only
suggestive, but, as I will show, it is robust to a series of multivariate analysis tests.
I employ two basic models to estimate the “constitutional” treatment effect: a cost
of service (COS) cross firms pricing model and a panel pass-trough model based
on states’ level data.26 Under COS, IOUs set prices at system-wide average costs,
which are: operations and maintenance (O&M) and depreciation and amortization
(D&A) payments, taxes (Taxes) and capital charges (Plant). All these figures are
25

If I look to the PUCs’ breakdown, only the residential users’ difference is significant (at 10%).

26

OLS estimates present robust standard errors. Joskow, Rose and Shepard [1993] and Kwoka

[2002], who is my reference in this subsection, employ similar pricing models. States that elect
their judges have historically offered “public benefit programs”. When I introduce binaries for
low-income assistance and funded demand side management programs, renewable promotion and
R&D initiatives into the pricing model no result is altered. The same holds true for input costs,
dual product monopoly and incentive based regulation dummies, sales, market conducts and the
other controls present in selection rules’ index models. The latter and the fact that neither Docket
nor Doc_Dur pass the endogeneity test would reassure the reader about the Leaver [2003]’s
results: commissioners’ length term has a negative effect on prices and a positive one on Docket.

24
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2006

25

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 10 [2006]

expressed in cents per Kwh. As (4) suggests, along with election an efficient
signal extraction technology lowers regulated prices. Instead, accountability rules
relaxing implicit incentives (Jud_Term) would increase them. I expect Employ,
Budget, Ind, Over_65 and Advocate to be positively related to more efficient

signal extraction technologies; 3Mem_Com (3 members’ PUC) would show an
opposite pattern. Finally, Doc_Dur - a proxy of a sour filing bargaining - would
have a positive marginal effect. Gen_Fuel and Join control for differences in the
generation structures and overall quality of institutions, respectively. Table 5
reports least squares estimates of the above pricing model. O&M, D&A, Taxes
and Plant (not reported) present the correct sign and are statistically highly
significant (most of the time at 1%). The magnitudes of the coefficients (except
the one of Plant) are near unit: these expenses are passed through dollar per dollar
to prices. The coefficients attached to Plant imply a 5% rate base. The evidence
on the signal extraction technology is mixed: an explanation similar to the one
given above applies here. Focusing on selection rules, Reg_Elec and Jud_Elec
assume, almost all the time, the correct negative signs but they are never
significant: could violations of the conditional independence assumption be
responsible for such a pattern? As shown in section 3.1, appointment rules are not
randomly assigned to states. Now, if the variation in constitutional rules used to
explain prices is related to the random (unexplained) determinants of the pricing
process, OLS inference becomes biased. Indeed, states may well self select into
election on the basis of legal, political and social treats fostering the planner
concerns with investments’ expropriation, as well as a basic strain in legally
favouring or making acceptable to consumers the need for technology progress. In
order to address this classical selection bias failure, I first decide what selection
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rule has to be correctly treated as exogenous. To this extent, Table 5 reports the pvalues of the Davidson and MacKinnon test:27 cross firms’ data advice to treat
only Jud_Elec as endogenous. Besides, it is worth to stress that Reg_Elec is never
significant when treated as endogenous and that the results do not change when
both dummies are contemporaneously treated as endogenous or interactiondummies (for example Reg_Elec*Jud_Elec) are added. The latter (whether or not
considered as endogenous) are always statistically not significant. This assures
that looking at the impact of supervisors’ election separately is the correct
strategy and not an unreasonable restriction on the data. I deal with selection bias
both employing instrumental variables and the LIML to isolate the truly
exogenous variation in the rules and directly adjusting OLS for “self-selection”.

4.2.1 Instrumental Variables, Heckman and LIML Estimates
The first stage of the 2SLS estimator is specified exactly as in section 4.2 and the
set of exogenous or excluded instruments (i.e. the controls that are significant in
the index models but not in the pricing equations) is given by: Av_Maj, Av_Dist,
Edu. These three variables have all the characteristics of good instruments: as

seen above, they are highly significant in explaining Jud_Elec and clearly enough
they are exogenous to the pricing process. Moreover, there are not small sample
problems here and the only reasonable objection to this specification strategy is
the possible weakness of the employed instruments. When the latter is not an
27

The Davidson and MacKinnon test consists of a two-step procedure. First, selection rules are

regressed on all the index and pricing models controls. Then the retrieved residuals are introduced
in the OLS specification reported in Table 5: if the OLS estimates are consistent, then the
coefficient on the first stage residuals should not be significant in the second step.
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issue the F-test on the excluded instruments has to be at least 10 (see Stock,
Wright and Yogo [2002]). As Table 4 shows, this figure for the Jud_Elec index
model is around 21. Such an observation along with the fact that the data never
reject the over-identifying restrictions, and that the results are robust to the
consideration of sub-sets of the excluded instruments reassures about the
consistency of the estimates. Columns (1) through (4) of Table 6 report the
coefficients attached to Jud_Elec and Reg_Elec when the first one is treated as
endogenous. Reg_Elec is, again, almost always negative but never significant
while Jud_Elec shows a negative marginal effect, significantly different from zero
for average and industrial rates (at 5%).28 Industrial users secure 1.130 cents per
Kwh, which is a considerable 21% reduction (the one for the average price is
about 16%). The evidence becomes sharp looking at Table 7: here LIML and
Heckman estimates of the average and industrial pricing equations are reported.
The relevant coefficients and standard errors remain almost unchanged and
Jud_Elec is significant at 5% in the Heckman estimates. Here, the correlation

between the residuals in the pricing and selection equations (rho) is positive (0.85
in (3) and 0.86 in (4)) and very precisely estimated: OLS tend to overestimate the
constitutional effect.29 So, when recursivity is relaxed, judges’ election implies a
28

Dockets’ filings interest the whole rate structure, so residential-voters would not be advantaged

over other users. Indeed, panel results show that the effect is significant for all customer classes.
29

Imposing linearity I have ruled out any interaction effect between institutions and controls. If

incorrect, such a hypothesis leads to inconsistency. Therefore, I estimated the average treatment
effect employing both propensity scores and matching estimators: the evidence is unchanged. This
is true also for a SUR estimator; moreover these system estimates show that there is no significant
correlation between the residuals of the two index models and residuals of the pricing equation.
This excludes the presence of unobservable determinants of both selection rules and prices.
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significant negative effect on electricity rates. I obtain similar evidence when the
dependent variable is the mark up of prices on average costs.

4.2.2 Panel Estimates
However, as explained above, even if robust to several estimation procedures,
persuasive cross-firms evidence has to be confirmed by the introduction of a time
dimension. This is why, exploiting the variation in selection rules and costs within
states,30 I look at the effect of cost shocks on prices running panel pass-through
models. Due to lack of data, the only available and reasonable measure of average
costs is the fossil fuels component (i.e., cs ,t - see also Besley and Coate [2003]).
To test once again part 2. of the Empirical Predictions, I run the following model
ps ,t = η s + β t + φ Reg _ Elecs ,t + ς Jud _ Elecs ,t + υ1 Reg _ Elecs ,t cs ,t +
+υ2 Jud _ Elecs ,t cs ,t + υ3cs ,t + ϕ Cons ,t + ε s ,t

(7)

for each customers class. In (7) ps ,t is a price for state s in year t; ηs are state
fixed effects controlling for long-run differences in production and distribution
systems; βt are year dummies picking up macro-shocks and common changes in
federal policy; Cons ,t includes both state specific time varying controls (Gen_Fuel,
Gen_Nucl, Income, Income2, Pop, Pop2) and proxies for the efficiency of the

supervision technology (Budget, Employ, Ind, Young, Over_65); Jud _ Elecs ,t and
Reg _ Elecs ,t represent the time varying dummy for election rules. Basic figures

30

Being simultaneity a real concern here, unlike Besley and Coate [2003], the panel data set

includes also the switching states. When switching states are excluded or the Besley and Coate
[2003]’s sample (1960-1997) is used, all the results continue to hold true.
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are given in Table 8. The coefficient on costs interacted with whether a state
elects its public officials is everywhere negative, but, again, only the elected
judges’ one is significant (at 1%). This implies that prices in judges electing states
are almost insensitive to shocks in the fossil fuels’ component of average costs.
These findings strengthen the cross-firms conclusions and provide strong
evidence on the critical relevance of the judges’ selection rule. Of course, as in
Besley and Coate [2003], only Reg _ Elecs ,t is significant when Jud _ Elecs ,t is
excluded. Selection rules enter also as direct effects: these coefficients, identified
purely off the time variation in the switching states, give the level effects of
institutions. These are positive for both rules but significant only in the judges’
case (see (3)) and always for Reg _ Elecs ,t . The total effect of Jud _ Elecs ,t is
ςˆ + υˆ3cs ,t = – 0.207 cents per Kwh for industrial rates. Residential and commercial

users enjoy a similar reduction (6%). When significant, the proxies for efficient
supervision technologies (except Over_65) show a negative sign: this would
partially reassure the reader about the mixed cross-firms’ results. This evidence is
confirmed when conditional independence is relaxed and I use the Arellano-Bond
estimator with two lags of the dependent variable: OLS overestimate the
Jud _ Elecs ,t effect and the over-identifying restrictions are never rejected.

5. Concluding Remarks
Strong “revolving door” and “legacy” effect may make ineffective the regulators’
institutional design and, indeed, U.S. electric power market data suggest that only
a reform from appointment to election of ALJs will significantly lower electricity
rates. This finding becomes sharp when conditional independence is relaxed and
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cross sectional-time series data are employed.31 Moreover, a better signal
extraction technology lowers rates along with institutions that focus supervisors’
implicit incentives. An open question remains: who is paying for lower electricity
prices? The welfare comparisons depend upon the weights that are placed on
short run (i.e., consumer surplus) vs. long run (i.e., technological efficiency)
perspectives. If investments’ concerns are relevant, a possibly partisan planner
will take both efficiency and rent seeking reasons into consideration: the index
models’ results confirm this idea. On top of it, my analysis delivers three main
points to be seriously considered by actual constitutional designers: 1. the
importance of a careful assessment of the benefits linked to independenceenhancing institutions (namely appointment) for supervisors when expropriation
of investment is a real concern; 2. the relevance of a deep evaluation of the
effective efficiency of the signal extraction technology (extent of participation of
watchdog groups and regulatory agencies’ resources) when accountability rules
are chosen; 3. the welfare gains related to a Constitutional table insulated from
short-term electoral boosts when the regulatory design is decided.

31

An interesting further test can be performed looking at the reforms from appointment to election

of ALJs. A nice case is South Dakota that switched in the middle of the sample (1981). When I
run a threshold model with controls Income, Pop, Young, Over_65, Gen_Fuel, Budget_S,
Employ_S, such a reform shows a significant (at 1%) negative effect on prices (19% reduction).
Due to the fewness of reforms, the analysis cannot be performed on a panel of switching states
only. Another robustness check consists in using the residential-industrial rate ratio (see Holburn
and Spiller [2002]) as dependent variable in the pass through specification. Again I obtain that
only Jud _ Elecs ,t has a small and significant marginal negative effect.
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6. Appendix
6.1 Implicitly Motivated Supervisors
Maximizing Ri ,l (ei ,l , S ) with respect to ei ,l given eiexp
, and imposing in equilibrium
,l
, involves, in an interior solution, the following first order conditions:
ei ,l = eiexp
,l
eˆA,R :

[3(1 – R)]/(2 eˆA,R )

eˆE , R :

[3(1 – R)fα( α )]/(2 eˆE , R ) =

C ′(eˆA, R ) ;

=

C ′(eˆE , R ) ;

eˆA, J :

3/(2 eˆA, J )

=

(1– J) C ′(eˆA, J ) ;

eˆE , J :

3fα( α )/(2 eˆE , J )

=

(1– J) C ′(eˆE , J ) .

Given that fα( α )>1, the solution efforts are such that: eˆE , J > eˆA, J and eˆE , R > eˆA, R .

■
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6.2 Underinvestment When the Planner Cannot Commit
The socially optimal Iˆ minimizes the sum of investment costs and ex post costs:

Iˆ ∈ arg min I ≥0 I + v(1 + ζ ( I ))θ + [1 − v(1 + ζ ( I )) ]θ = I + θ − v(1 + ζ ( I ))∆θ

(8)

This amounts to say that the objective in (8) assumes a value greater at I* than at Iˆ .
Evidently, the same can be said for the objective function in (5). Once I sum these two
inequalities, the following expression holds in equilibrium:

I * + θ − v(1 + ζ ( I * )) ∆θ + v(1 + ζ ( I * ))[1 − γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )]∆θ qˆ S , I ( I * ) − I * ≥
Iˆ + θ − v(1 + ζ ( Iˆ)) ∆θ + v(1 + ζ ( Iˆ))[1 − γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )]∆θ qˆ S , I ( I * ) − Iˆ

{

}

or v(ζ ( Iˆ) − ζ ( I * ))∆θ 1 − [1 − γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J )]qˆ S , I ( I * ) ≥ 0 . Given the properties of ζ ′(i) and the
first order condition of (5), I have that ζ ( Iˆ) ≥ ζ ( I * ) or I * ≤ Iˆ . If, as it is likely, the cost
of investment is lower in low cost markets and taking into consideration how K affects

γ (eˆi , R , eˆi , J ) , Proposition 3 immediately follows.

■

6.3 Positive Determinants of Regulators’ Appointment Rule
A planner of type j will prefer election if the following holds:

(

)

WPAI , S ( E ) − WPAI , S ( A) > ο ∂G ( A, j ) ∂I − ∂G ( E , j ) ∂I + v {(1 + λ + χ j ) [γ ( A)G ( A, − j ) +

−γ ( E )G ( E , − j ) + x j [γ ( A)(G ( A, j ) − G ( A, − j )) − γ ( E )(G ( A, j ) +

}

−G ( E , − j )) ] + ( χ j − 1 − λ ) γ ( A) I ( A, j ) − γ ( E ) I ( E , j ) 

(9)

where – j represents the opposing party. At this point, note that G (i, j ) ≥ I (i, j ) and that
the following inequalities hold by hypotheses:

I ( A, R) ≥ I ( A, D); I ( E , R) ≥ I ( E , D); γ ( A) > γ ( E ); G ( A, R) ≥ G ( A, D);
G ( E , R) ≥ G ( E , D); G ( A, R ) − G ( A, D) ≥ G ( E , R ) − G ( E , D) .

(10)

As a consequence, (9) rewrites for an incumbent Republican as:
WPAI ,S ( E ) − WPAI ,S ( A) > ο {G1 ( A, D) − G1 ( E , D) + xR [G1 ( A, R) − G1 ( E, R) − G1 ( A, D) − G1 ( E , D)] +
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+v {(2d + λ ) [γ ( A)G( A, D) − γ ( E )G( E, D) + xR [ (γ ( A) − γ ( E ))(G( A, R) +

−G( A, D)) + γ ( E)(G( A, R) − G( A, D) − G(E, R) + G( E, D))] +
+(2d − λ ) [ I ( A, D) − I ( E, D) + xR ( I ( A, R) − I ( A, D) − I ( E, R) + I ( E, D))]} . (11)

Taking into consideration (10), the comparative statics with respect to {d , x , J }
of
j
j = D, R
the right hand side of (11) and of the symmetric expression for a type D planner lead to
Proposition 4 in the text.

■

6.4 Data
This analysis exploits both cross sectional and time variation in the data. The cross
sectional analysis’ sample consists of 144 firms belonging to 46 states and the District of
Columbia for 1996. Nebraska has been excluded because it has no investor–owned
utilities while Utah, Wyoming and Alaska because only minor (see below) utilities serve
these states. Only data at the state level are available in the panel analysis that spans the
period 1970-1997. Here, besides Nebraska, the District of Columbia has been excluded
because no data points are available before 1987. This choice does not change any result.

I. Cross Sectional Analysis:
A.1 Data for electricity prices, operations and maintenance expenses, taxes, utility’s net
electric plant (in thousands dollars) and sales (in Mwh) are directly collected from a
Department of Energy (DOE) publication:
DOE, [1996], Financial Statistics of Major U.S. Investor–Owned Electric Utilities, EIA
Washington DC.
This survey is processed and published by EIA (Energy Information Administration) for
the FERC. Major investor-owned electric utilities are defined as those that, in the past
three consecutive calendar years, meet one or more of the following criteria: 1.1 million
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Mwh of total annual sales; 2. 100 Mwh of annual sales for resale; 3. 500 Mwh of annual
power exchanges delivered; 4. 500 Mwh of annual wheeling for others.
The 1996 data are based on reports from 179 major IOUs. Only those 144 that sell energy
to all and each of the three broader customer classes (i.e., residential, commercial and
industrial) have been included (see Guerriero [2006, b] for a complete breakdown).
Average price is calculated as total revenue from sales to ultimate consumers divided by
the corresponding quantity. Residential, commercial and industrial prices are calculated
from the respective revenues and sales; O&M, D&A, Taxes and Plant represent average
production costs and they are computed dividing the relevant expenses by total sales (i.e.
the sum of sales to ultimate consumers plus sales for resale). In particular, operations and
maintenance expenses are the sum of direct costs of power generation, transmission, and
distribution and overhead costs (customer accounts and service and sales, administrative
and general expenses). Taxes represents the sum of federal and state income taxes, other
taxes, plus minor adjustments for net payments for deferred taxes and investment tax
credit. These figures are expressed in cents per Kwh.

A.2 The NASUCA website lists the states that present a state consumer advocate office.
A.3 Data on education are from Geospatial and Statistical Data Center (GEOSTAT).
A.4 Join is directly collected from Hanssen [2004 a].

II. Panel Analysis:
B.1 Data on electric prices, generation and the price of fossil fuels (composite) per net
Kwh are collected or calculated from the EEI (Edison Electric Institute) yearbooks:
EEI, [1995], 1960-1992, Historical Statistics of the Electric Utility Industry;
EEI, [1993-1997], Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry, Washington D. C.
EEI refers to the source of data for its yearbooks to various places including DOE, EIA,
Federal Power Commission and FERC. EEI reports annual revenues (in dollar terms) and
sales (in Kwh) by state and class of service. Prices are calculated from the revenues and
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sales in terms of cents per Kwh. Residential, commercial and industrial users account for
the 95% of revenues. EEI reports electric generation and sources of energy for generation
in two types of breakdown, i.e., by type of prime mover driving the generator and by
energy source. The totals from the two of them are consistent. I used the second one.

B.2 To construct the fossil fuel cost index for state i in year t, let sjit be the share of
energy source j in state i in year t and let pit be the price of fossil fuels (composite) per net
Kwh (in cents per Kwh) for state i in year t, calculated as: pit = Σj (qjit/qit) pijt. Then the
fossil fuel cost series will be given by cit = Σj sjit pit where sit is the share of electricity
produced in state i in year t by the fossil fuel energy sources j (i.e.: coal, gas and oil).

B.3 Data on regulatory selection rules, PUCs’ budgets, number of commissioners and
number of PUCs’ full time employees are collected from:
NARUC, [1970-1997], Yearbook of Regulatory Agencies, NARUC, Washington DC.

B.4 Political preferences are from the CSG (Council of State Governments) yearbooks:
CSG, [1970-1997], The Book of the States, CSG, Lexington, KY.

B.5 Data on judges’ selection rule and length terms are collected from Hanssen, F.
Andrew [2004 b, Table 1] and Besley, Timothy and A. Abigail Payne, [2003, Table 1].

B.6 State income per capita, population, proportion aged over 65 and proportion aged 517 are calculated from a U.S. Census Bureau (UCB) publication:
UCB, [1970-1997], Population Estimates Program, UCB, Washington DC.

B.7 Data on dockets concerning the US electric power market are collected from:
NARUC, [1974-1990], Annual Report on Utility and Carrier Regulation of the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, K. Bauer edition, Washington D.C.
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6.5 Tables
Preliminary Analysis
Table 1: Variables Names and Descriptions.
Prices

Var.
Rkha/r/c/i:
Reg_Elec:

Description
Revenue per Kwh sales (average, residential, commercial, industrial).
Dummy taking value 1 if commissioners are elected, 0 otherwise.

Jud_Elec:
Jud_Term:
Av_Maj:

Dummy taking value 1 if judges are elected, 0 otherwise.
Judges’ term length.

Selection Rules
Accountability

Political
Variables

Effectiveness
of Supervision

Watchdog
Groups

Average Costs
(Proxies for the
Relevance
of Investments’
Decisions)

Other
Controls

Av_Dist:

Percentage of seats (averaged across upper and lower houses) held by the
majority (Av_Maj.1996 = average within the 1986-1996 period).
Absolute difference between percentage of seats held by Democrats and
Republicans (Av_Dist.1996 = average within the 1986-1996 period).

Rep:
3Mem_Com:

Dummy taking value 1 if the government is Republican, 0 otherwise.

Advocate:

Consumer advocate’s dummy, taking value 1 if the state has a state
consumer advocate office dealing with electricity dockets, 0 otherwise.

Employ:

Dummy taking value 1 if commissioners are three, 0 otherwise.

PUC’s full time employees.

Budget:
Over_65:

PUC’s total receipts in thousands dollars.

Young:

Percentage of population aged 5-17.

Ind:

Percentage of revenue from industrial users.

Dockets:

Number of dockets (electricity) opened in front of the PUC per firm.

Doc_Dur:
O&M:

Duration of dockets (electricity) opened in front of the PUC per firm
(%Docket > 5 = Percentage Enduring More than Five Months).
Operation and maintenance costs in cents per Kwh sales.

D&A:

Depreciation and amortization costs in cents per Kwh sales.

Taxes:

Taxes payments in cents per Kwh sales.

cst:

Cost of fossil fuels (in cents per Kwh sales) – see Appendix 6.2.

P_Fuel:

Price of fossil fuels (composite) per net Kwh sales (cents per Kwh).

Plant:
Gen_Fuel:

Imputed cost of net electric utility plant in cents per Kwh sales.
Percentage of total generation from fossil fuels sources.

Gen_Nucl:

Percentage of total generation from nuclear source.

Join:

Year in which the state has joined the union.

Edu:

Per. of 1990 population aged 25 and over, who graduated high school.

Income:

State income per capita in dollars.

Pop:

State Population in Thousands People.

Percentage of population aged 65 and over.
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Table 2: Mean in Mean Differences.

Dockets
%Docket > 5
Doc_Dur
N. of obs.

States that
Elect Judges

State that
Appoint Judges
1974 – 1990

0.531
(0.086)
0.788
(0.249)
8.912
(1.352)
680

0.574
(0.127)
0.876
(0.176)
9.094
(2.353)
680

All
0.552
(0.109)
0.833
(0.218)
9.003
(1.892)
680

1970 – 1997
4.852
6.804
(2.288)
(2.797)
4.609
6.268
Rkhc
***
(2.008)
(2.631)
3.055
4.437
Rkhi
***
(1.506)
(2.093)
1372
1372
N. of observations
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses;
2. Test for Equality of Means Between Series:
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Rkhr

***

5.845
(2.739)
5.453
(2.487)
3.758
(1.954)
1372

Table 3: Supervisors’ Selection Rule, 1970–1996.
Judges’ Selection Rule
Jud_Elec [21]:

Jud_App [21]:

Jud_Switch [8]:

AL[P], AR[P], GA[P(1970-1983)/Np], ID[Np], IL[P], KY[Np],
LA[P(1970-1975)/Np], MI[Np], MN[Np], MS[P(1970-1994)/Np],
MT[Np], NV[Np], NC[P], ND[Np], OH[Np], OR[Np],
PA[P], TX[P], WA[Np], WV[P], WI[Np];
AK[Mp], CA[G], CO[Mp], CT[G], DC[G], DE[G], HI[Mp],
IN[Mp], IA[Mp], KS[Mp], ME[G], MA[G], MO[Mp], NH[G],
NJ[G], OK[Mp], RI[Le(1970-1994)/G], SC[Le], UT[Mp],
VT[Le(1970-1974)/G], VA[Le];
AZ[Np(1970-1974)/Mp], FL[P(1970-1972)/Np(1972-1976)/Mp]
MD[Np(1970-1975)/Mp], NM[P(1970-1989)/Mp],
NY[P(1970-1977)/G], SD[Np(1970-1981)/Mp],
TN[P(1970-1994)/Mp], WY[Np(1970-1972)/Mp].

Commissioners’ Selection Rule
AL, AZ, GA, LA, MS, MT, ND, OK, SD, VA;
AK, AR, CA, CO, CT, DC, DE, HI, ID, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, ME,
Reg_App [35]:
MD, MA, MI, MO, NV, NH, NJ, NM, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, RI,
UT, VT, WA, WV, WI, WY;
FL[E(1970-1981)/A], TX[E(1970-1976)/A(1977-1996)]
Reg_Switch [5]:
MN[E(1960-1971)/A(1972-1975)/E(1976-1977)/A],
SC[E(1970-1995)/A], TN[E(1970-1995)/A].
Note: 1. No investor–owned electric utilities serve Nebraska.
Reg_Elec [10]:
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Non Random Constitution Selection
Table 4: Determinants of Selection Rule - Logit and RE Logit Estimates.
Dependent Var.:

(1)
Reg_Elec

Av_Maj
Av_Maj*Rep
Rep
Av_Dist
Ind
Advocate
Over_65

-444.915
(220.298)**
-39.068
(16.826)**
-8.120
(3.379)**

Young
Budget
Employ

-0.003
(0.001)**
0.300
(0.123)**

(2)
Reg_Elec
40.948
(24.609)*
-68.553
(24.673)***
39.449
(14.103)***
-5.500
(11.539)
51.153
(15.385)***

2.184
(0.930)**
-2.270
(0.962)**
-0.0002
(0.0001)**
0.0074
(0.0082)

Doc_Dur

(3)
Jud_Elec

(4)
Jud_Elec
41.514
(11.128)***

166.669
(70.938)**
-2.358
(1.019)**
-0.157
(0.146)

0.0004
(0.0002)**
-0.029
(0.010)***
0.984
(0.236)***

-21.077
(5.499)***
29.570
(5.670)***

-0.576
(0.431)
0.032
(0.286)
-0.00006
(0.00003)**
-0.0036
(0.0020)*

-67.462
(28.472)**

P_Fuel

-4.376
(2.053)**

cst

-0.384
(0.532)
-0.634
(0.222)***

O&M
1.847
(0.911)**

Plant

-1.187
(0.350)***
-301.906
(75.234)***
145.057
(34.980)***

Jud_Term
Av_Maj.1996
Av_Dist.1996
Gen_Fuel

-925.476
(425.049)**
600.492
(278.503)**
-75.405
(37.264)**

7.04e-07
(2.95e-07)**
-0.0008
(0.0001)**

Pop
-0.0006
(0.0003)**

Income
Edu
Join
Constant

0.237
(0.125)*
234.086
(96.463)**
Logit
144
0.90

-28.125
(14.401)**
RE Logit Panel
1372

Estimation
N. of Observations
Pseudo R2
-76.218
Log Likelihood
9.08**
Chi_2
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses;

-0.846
(0.226)***
0.028
(0.010)***
175.472
(53.875)***
Logit
144
0.57

-19.519
(5.755)***
RE Logit Panel
1372
-125.530

21.06***

2. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
3. Chi_2 refers to the joint significance test on excluded instruments.
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Cross–sectional and Panel Inference
Table 5: Determinants of Prices - OLS Estimates.
Dependent Var.:
Reg_Elec
Jud_Elec
Jud_Term
Advocate
Budget
Employ
Over_65
Ind
Doc_Dur
3Mem_Com
Join

(1)
Rkha

(2)
Rkhr

(3)
Rkhc

(4)
Rkhi

-0.080
(0.225)
-0.189
(0.174)
0.020
(0.028)
0.295
(0.229)
0.00003
(0.00002)*
-0.0024
(0.0013)*
0.020
(0.043)
7.264
(11.385)
-0.022
(0.038)
0.351
(0.168)**
-0.004
(0.002)*

-0.073
(0.310)
-0.163
(0.239)
0.087
(0.039)**
0.857
(0.315)***
0.00005
(0.00002)**
-0.0044
(0.0018)**
-0.011
(0.059)
5.804
(15.673)
0.082
(0.050)*
0.435
(0.232)*
-0.003
(0.003)

0.273
(0.276)
-0.026
(0.212)
0.030
(0.034)
0.696
(0.280)**
0.00004
(0.00002)**
-0.0037
(0.0016)**
-0.051
(0.053)
8.780
(13.929)
0.084
(0.046)*
0.295
(0.206)
-0.0005
(0.003)

-0.094
(0.211)
0.012
(0.163)
0.028
(0.026)
0.114
(0.215)
0.00002
(0.00002)
-0.0026
(0.0012)**
0.052
(0.040)
28.951
(10.670)***
-0.028
(0.035)
0.140
(0.158)
-0.001
(0.002)

0.71
0.58
0.77
D&M Test: Reg_Elec
0.02
0.24
0.57
D&M Test: Jud_Elec
Constant, O&M, D&A, Taxes, Plant, Gen_Fuel.
Other Controls
OLS
OLS
OLS
Estimation
144
144
144
N. of Observations
0.89
0.83
0.82
Adjusted R2

0.52
0.01
OLS
144
0.88

Notes: 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses;
2. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%;
3. The specification for the first step of the D&M test on the regulators’ selection rule is:
Constant, Av_Maj, Av_Dist, P_Fuel, Pop, Over_65, Jud_Term, 3Mem_Com, Advocate,
Doc_Dur, Budget, Employ, Ind,Join, Jud_Elec, O&M, D&A, Taxes, Plant, Gen_Fuel;
4. The specification for the first step of the D&M test on the judges’ selection rule is:
Constant, Av_Maj, Av_Dist, Edu, Over_65, Jud_Term, 3Mem_Com, Advocate,
Doc_Dur, Budget, Employ, Ind, Join, Reg_Elec, O&M, D&A, Taxes, Plant, Gen_Fuel.

Table 6: Determinants of Prices - Instrumental Variables Estimates.
Dependent Var.:
Reg_Elec

(1)
Rkha

(2)
Rkhr

(3)
Rkhc

(4)
Rkhi

-0.315
-0.233
0.206
-0.361
(0.274)
(0.348)
(0.302)
(0.280)
-1.160
-0.824
-0.305
-1.130
Jud_Elec
(0.489)**
(0.621)
(0.540)
(0.484)**
0.70
0.47
0.94
0.85
Ov-Id Test (P-Value)
J_Elec
J_Elec
J_Elec
J_Elec
Endogenous Var.:
Constant, Jud_Term, 3Mem_Com, Advocate, Doc_Dur, Budget, Employ, Over_65,
Other Controls
Ind, O&M, D&A, Taxes, Plant, Gen_Fuel , Join.
2SLS
2SLS
2SLS
2SLS
Estimation
144
144
144
144
N. of Observations
0.87
0.82
0.82
0.84
Adjusted R2
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses;
2. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%;
3. First-stage specification of 2SLS includes second step right hand side controls plus:
Av_Maj, Av_Dist, Edu.
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Table 7: Determinants of Prices - LIML and Heckman Estimates.
Dependent Var.:
Reg_Elec

(1)
Rkha

(2)
Rkhi

(3)
Rkha

-0.323
(0.270)
-1.196
(0.470)**

-0.370
(0.257)
-1.149
(0.460)**

(4)
Rkhi

-0.079
-0.069
(0.204)
(0.191)
-1.017
-0.856
Jud_Elec
(0.220)***
(0.212)***
0.85***
0.86***
Rho
Jud_Elec
Jud_Elec
Jud_Elec
Jud_Elec
Endogenous Var.:
Constant, Jud_Term, 3Mem_Com, Advocate, Doc_Dur, Budget, Employ, Over_65,
Other Controls
Ind, O&M, D&A, Taxes, Plant, Gen_Fuel, Join.
LIML
LIML
Heck. ML
Heck. ML
Estimation
144
144
144
144
N. of Observations
2
0.87
0.83
Adjusted R
-196.034
-190.904
Log Likelihood
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses;
2. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%;
3. First-stage specification of LIML includes first step right hand side controls plus:
Av_Maj, Av_Dist, Edu.
4. First-stage specification of Heckman includes:
Constant, Av_Maj, Av_Dist, Edu, Over_65, Ind, Jud_Term,
Advocate, Doc_Dur, Budget, Employ, O&M, Join.

Table 8: Results on Pass-through - Introduction of Jud_Elec.
Dependent Var.:

Reg_Elecst
Jud_Elecst
Reg_Elecst.cst
Jud_Elecst.cst
cst
Budgetst
Employst
Indst
Youngst
Over_65st

(1)
Rkhr

(2)
Rkhc

(3)
Rkhi

0.724
(0.227)***
-0.094
(0.170)
-0.032
(0.109)
-0.516
(0.100)***
0.553
(0.056)***

0.973
(0.225)***
-0.164
(0.169)
-0.138
(0.109)
-0.463
(0.099)***
0.542
(0.056)***

0.552
(0.185)***
0.297
(0.138)**
-0.006
(0.089)
-0.458
(0.082)***
0.517
(0.046)***

-2.14e-06
(1.53e-06)
-0.0019
(0.0007)***
-1.860
(0.633)***
-0.075
(0.019)***
0.042
(0.025)*

-1.52e-06
(1.52e-06)
-0.0008
(0.0007)
0.782
(0.628)
-0.085
(0.018)***
0.053
(0.026)**

-2.32e-06
(1.25e-06)*
-0.0012
(0.0006)**
0.203
(0.516)
-0.055
(0.015)***
0.079
(0.021)***

2
2
Other Controls Gen_Fuelst , Gen_Nuclst , Popst , (Popst) , Incomest , (Incomest) .
Fixed time and state effects (within) estimator.
Estimation
1372
1372
N. of Obs.
2
0.88
0.85
R

1372
0.83

Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses;
2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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